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Petitioner Prosper Team, Inc. respectfully submits its reply brief on appeal.

ARGUMENT
The critical issue on appeal is whether the Employment Security Act requires
unemployment benefits to be awarded when some element of the employee's job is
outside his or her control. In this case, both parties agree that Hickman did not and
could not control the economy. By its ruling the Board effectively creates a new
unemployment standard that awards unemployment benefits to all sales employees in
virtually all instances because the economy will always be outside their control.

I. PROSPER'S REPLY TO THE BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The Board in its Brief (hereinafter B. at

), states that it supplements and

corrects Prosper Team Inc.'s (hereinafter ^Prosper") Statement of Fact. Prosper
responds to1 and corrects the Board's supplemental facts as follows:
•

The Board cites to the record at R.60:6-l 1, that Hickman was Prosper's longest
employed salesman. (B. at 3). The record indicates that Hickman saw a picture
on a wall where various individuals in the picture did not appear to still be
working at Prosper. This observation from a picture on a wall does not establish
that Hickman is one of Prosper's longest employed salesmen, nor is there any
other evidence to support this conclusion.

1

The Board's untimely filing of its Brief may impact its opportunity to participate
in oral arguments, Utah R. App. P. 26(c), but Prosper still needs to respond to any
perceived inaccuracies raised by the Board in its presentation of the facts.
1

•

The Board states that after Hickman' surgery for a hernia, his sales started to
decline. (B. at 3). The record establishes that Hickman's sales had started to
decline months prior to his surgery. (R. at 055, 26-29).

•

The Board states that after Hickman underwent hernia surgery, that Hickman
returned to work "prematurely". The record establishes that upon returning to
work, Hickman testified that he "overdid it". (R. at 055, line 6). The record does
not support the medical conclusion that Hickman returned to work prematurely.

•

The Board cites to the record at 055:26-29, that Hickman's supervisor continually
assured him that the Employer would work with him to increase his sales. (B at
4). The cited record establishes that Hickman asked his supervisor if the
supervisor would "work with" him because of his hernia. The record does not
establish that Hickman's supervisor "continually assured" him of anything, nor
does the record establish that Hickman's requested that Prosper work with him to
increase his sales.

•

The Board states that the "fine print" on the Employee Counseling Report says
termination was a possible outcome for failure to improve. (B. at 4). The
Employee Counseling Report does state that failure to improve could result in
termination, but the referenced disclosure is in a font similar in size and emphasis
as the other parts of the form.

•

The Board states that Hickman was not verbally informed at the meeting when
he received his written warning that his job was in jeopardy. (B. at 4). The
record does not establish whether Hickman was verbally warned at this time that
2

his job was in jeopardy, however, the record does establish that when the written
warning was issued, the parties discussed specifics of the written warning (R. at
042, lines 15-45).

II. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN AWARDING
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
ECONOMY PREVENTED A FINDING OF "CONTROL".
The issue on appeal is whether the Employment Security Act requires
unemployment benefits to be awarded when an employee works under circumstances
where he or she does not have complete control over all the factors involved in
achieving success. The decision by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which the
Workforce Appeals Board adopted "in foil the reasoning, conclusions of law and
decision" states in part:
The element of control has not been established. The Claimant did not have
complete control over the low sales that led to his discharge. Increasing sales
depended on others agreeing to purchase the Employer's services over other
options for their money, which the Claimant could not control. There are many
possible reasons a potential customer would choose not to use the Employer's
services. ... In this case, there were too many other factors involved to give the
Claimant control over his sales, including the poor economy and the high
unemployment rate. (Emphasis added)(R. at 072).
As the decision states, the Board believes that an employee needs to have
"complete control" over all factors of their job in order to establish a just cause
discharge. In this case that means having control over "others agreeing to purchase the
Employer's services", the "poor economy", "the high unemployment rate", and "too
many other factors". (R. at 072). By affirming the ALJ's decision, the Board establishes

3

what is tantamount to strict liability for employers that hire employees in sales.2 The
Board supports its conclusion by reciting boilerplate language that factors not within an
employee's control cannot be used to establish fault, and since Hickman could not have
control over the economy, he cannot be at fault. (B. at 12). However, this conclusion
skirts the analysis necessary to establish whether Hickman was at fault.
In Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), the employee was discharged for attendance violations. Though some of the
absences were due to medical problems beyond Stegen's control, this Court agreed that
"other circumstances contributing to plaintiffs absenteeism resulted from poor planning
and from personal situations within plaintiffs control." Therefore the denial of benefits
was affirmed on the grounds that some of the circumstances leading to the separation
were within the claimant's control.
Here the Board cites the unpublished opinion of Market Reps, Inc., v. Workforce
Appeals Bd, 2003 UT App 244 as establishing that "economic conditions can
'materially and adversely' affect an employee's ability to meet productivity standards
beyond the employee's control." (B. at 11). However, the Marketing Reps decision is
not inconsistent with Stegen. The fact that economic conditions may adversely affect a

2

The scope of this decision goes well beyond employees in sales. The same
argument can be made in many other industries such as by stock brokers who do not
control the stock market or bank workers who fail to attract new customers because
customers can always take their money to another bank.

3

The Board attempts to directly correlate the facts of this case into the facts of
Market Reps. Though there are some similarities, there are also notable differences.
First, in Market Reps the employee was sick for one week and then attempted to make
4

sales person's ability to meet productivity standards can be a factor in determining
whether the separation was within the employee's control. The problem is that the
Board is making the economic conditions the only factor in determining the issue of
control. The Board argues that "Clearly, the Claimant does not have control over the
economy, and despite the Employer's objections, if the Claimant lacked control over the
external factor leading to his discharge, just cause is not shown." (Emphasis added)(B.
at 12).
The "external factor" (not factors) the Board references that Hickman lacked
control over is the economy. Thus the sentence can more clearly be written to say that
"if the Claimant lacked control over the economy (the external factor), just cause is not
shown." Such a narrow view of the element of control is both inconsistent with the
Department Rules ("A just cause discharge must include some fault on the part of the
claimant" R994-405-201(2010)), as well as the holding in Stegen. The correct analysis
is to determine whether Hickman was at fault in causing the separation.
There were a variety of factors within Hickman's control and it is Prosper's
position that it was these factors that led to the separation. Factors such as his attitude,

sales right after Christmas. In this case, Hickman had only two sales in a six month
period. Second, in that case the employer did not challenge the Board's factual findings
and the decision was made "relying on the unchallenged findings of the Board" Id. at
f 6. Here, Prosper has challenged the Board's findings that it was the economy that
caused the separation and Prosper also challenged the Board's findings regarding the
element of knowledge. Third, the Board in Marketing Reps concluded the economy
affected the employee's ability to make sales, whereas here, the Board is arguing that a
just cause discharge cannot be established unless it is shown that the employee was in
control of all external factors related to the separation, including the economy.

5

(R. at 044, lines 33-37), whether Hickman put his phone on "busy" to block further
calls, (R. at 052, lines 31-32), whether he uses a shorter script (R. at 043, lines 1-6), and
whether he was positive and confident about the products being offered (R. at 046, lines
22-30).
Also, a fact that cannot be understated is that other similarly situated employees
were being successful under the same circumstances. (R. at 049, lines 1-7). Hickman
was the only person on the whole team that was terminated for lack of performance.
Others on the same team were receiving the same calls, selling the same product,
working the same hours, and operating under the same conditions. They were able to
make sales under the same circumstances that Hickman could not. Thus the appropriate
analysis is not whether Hickman had complete control over the economy, but rather,
whether it was within Hickman's control to make sales similar to the other employees
around him.4 Prosper asserts that it was Hickman's continued inefficiency or lack of care
that led to the separation and not the economy outside his control.

4

The Board suggests that the cases of Self v. Board of Review, 453A.2d 170(NJ.
1982), and Yardville Supply Co., v. Board of Review, 544 A.2d 1337 (N.J. 1989) are not
on point. (B. at 13). However, the Board misinterprets the relevance of the cases. In
Self the employee lost his ride to work when a fellow employee quit and in Yardville the
employee lost his license when he was driving drunk. Both of these cases resulted in
loss of employment due to external factors. The cases are cited to establish that when
external factors result in a loss of employment, and the employer did not influence those
factors (had the employer in moved the company in Self or had the employer required
the employee to drive knowing he was under the influence in Yardville), examiners need
to carefully establish whether the employee was at fault and not automatically award
benefits on the grounds that the employee was not in control of the external factor.

6

The Board seeks support for its conclusions by making various references to
Hickman's lack of "ability11 to make sales. For example, on page 15 of their Brief, the
Board states "Department Rule R994-405-202 provides: fif the claimant made a good
faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to lack of ability and a
discharge results, just cause is not established.'" (See also B. at 11) Unfortunately, the
Board does not accurately quote is own Rule. R994-405-202(3)(b) provides that if an
employee fails to meet the job requirements "due to a lack of skill or ability, then just
cause is not established." It is well established that the "ability" referenced in this Rule
is the skill and ability to do his or her job, not whether the employee was inhibited or
prohibited from doing his or her job due to some extrinsic factor.
The Boards also makes various references to Hickman "ill health" as being a
significant factor in why he was unable to make sales. Though this may have been true
in the Market Reps decision, the same is not true here. Prosper does not want to
diminish the fact that Hickman was experiencing some medical issues due to a hernia,
but a hernia isn't an incapacitating injury that prevented Hickman from working.
Hickman reduced his hours to during the month of July to work part-time. Hickman
was released to return to full time work on August 3, 2009. Therefore, the Court should
not view a one month part-time work adjustment as justifying months and months
without sales. Even ignoring the lack of performance prior to surgery, after returning to
full-time work Hickman had three months to make sales before being terminated. Yet in
this three month period he only made one sale. If Hickman's health issues reduced his

7

ability to make sales during the month of July, his release and return to work gave him
sufficient time to reestablish making regular sales. Hickman failed to do so.
Hickman had been successful in the past, and similarly situated employees were
being successful in the present. Prosper asserts that it was Hickman's inefficiency that
led to his separation. The Board was arbitrary and capricious to hold that a lack of
control over the economy is sufficient to establish a lack of control to do his job.
Prosper asserts that to require an employer to prove that a terminated employee has
control over all external factors that may relate to his or her job is neither supported by
the law, nor is it a policy that should be adopted. Such a standard essentially creates a
strict liability for employers and is not contemplated by the Employment Security Act.
The Board's decision should be reversed.

III. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.
The Board asserts that Prosper failed to establish the element of knowledge for a
just cause discharge. Oddly, the Board ignores the fact that Hickman admits to
receiving both verbal and written warnings before his termination (R. at 009); that he
understood why he was terminated, (R. at 009); that he was aware of others that had
been terminated for the same reason (R. at 061, lines 29-31); and that the ALJ found
Hickman knew what was expected of him. (R. at 072).
The Board attempts to shoehorn the facts of this case to correlate with the
unpublished opinion of Harley Davidson v. Workforce App. Bd., 2006 UT App 61. The

8

Board inaccurately suggests that Hickman did not understand he would be terminated
because Prosper's warnings were "vague and inconsistent". (B. at 8). However, there is
little if any evidence to suggest that the warnings were either vague or inconsistent.
In applying for unemployment benefits Hickman filled out the Department's
application for benefits by responding:
Were you told to change or improve your job performance? YES
Did you receive any warning before being fired or discharged? YES
If yes, how were you warned? VERBAL
When?

10/03/09

Have others been fired or discharged for the same reason? YES
How did you violate the policy? BECAUSE OF LACK OF SALE
(R. at 009, Exhibit 9)(Responses in Bold).
There does not appear to be anything vague or inconsistent with Hickman's responses to
the Department's questions.
On October 3, 2009, Prosper issue Hickman a verbal warning. Hickman admits
to receiving this verbal warning. (R. at 009). When things did not improve over the
next two weeks, Hickman's supervisor talked with him again and issued him a written
warning. (R. at 013). There is nothing vague or inconsistent with this approach. The
evidence suggests that Hickman recognized the October discussions to be warnings

9

rather than general encouragement because he specifically identified them as warnings.
When Hickman's performance did not improve, he was terminated.5
Rather than taking a reasonable view of Prospers measured and methodical
approach, the Board seems to focus on whether Hickman thought his termination was
"imminent". (B. at 9). The Board goes so far as to criticize Prosper's actions by
advancing the illogical argument that even though Hickman admitted receiving
warnings prior to being fired, "a 'warning before being fired' does not indicate that he
received a warning that he was going to be fired'' (Original emphasis)(B. at 10). By its
very nature a warning communicates a cautionary message that needs to be heeded. As
such, Hickman's "warning before being fired" communicated the cautionary message
that Hickman needed to improve his performance or he was "going to be fired".
The Board also suggests that even though Hickman had received both a verbal
and written warnings, that his "supervisor continually assured" him that Prosper would
"work with him".6 The record does not establish that Prosper "continually assure"

5

The Board criticizes Prosper for giving Hickman eight days after the final written
warning before termination. However, as established by the record, Hickman received a
verbal warning on October 3, 2009. This gives Hickman 25 days between the first
warning and his termination. Prosper testified that it only takes a day or two to turn a
lead into a sale, and as such, even if Hickman only had eight days, according to the
testimony, this was sufficient time to show improved activity in sales. (R. at 043, lines
17-28).
6

The Board, on page 8 of its Brief, states: "The Claimant credibly testified he
believed Mr. Johnson would continue to work with him until his sales improved." This
statement is not supported by the record. (B. at 8, citing R.55:26-29). The cited
testimony shows that Hickman testified Prosper would work with him regarding his
hernia, but there is no evidence that Proper would work with Hickman until his sales
improved.
10

Hickman of anything. Hickman's testimony about Proper agreeing to "work with" him
arises out of a requests for latitude regarding his not feeling well. (R. at 055, lines 2829). However, the issue of "working with" an employee has been previously addressed
inlaw Offices of David Paul White & Assoc, v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 21 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
In Law Offices of David Paul White, the employer gave the employee instruction
regarding appropriate behavior. The employee's behavior would improve for several
days and then revert back to the former behavior. In awarding benefits the Board
concluded that whatever counseling the employer gave was negated by the employer's
continued acceptance of her behavior. Id. at 25. In reversing, this Court explicitly
rejected as not being reasonable and rational the conclusion that "whatever counseling
the employer gave the claimant with regard to her 'office personality' was negated by his
continued acceptance of her behavior so that ultimately the claimant was not given a
clear standard of what the employer expected of her." (Emphasis added). Id. at 25. This
Court found that "An employer who is willing to take ample time to work with an
employee to resolve objectionable conduct ought not to be penalized when he finally
terminates the employee." Id. A similar conclusion is appropriate here.
Prosper gave Hickman specific verbal and written warnings instructing him to
improve his performance. It does not reflect sound policy to penalize Prosper for not
firing Hickman five months earlier. It does not reflect sound policy to assert that if a
company "works with" an employee, it cannot terminate them because the message will

11

be "inconsistent" or somehow the employee won't think the termination was
"imminent."7 Hickman was expected to make sales each week. Any employee in a sales
position would reasonably anticipate that if he or she makes only two sales in six
months, and no sales in the months prior to a verbal and written warning, that unless
performance improved, he or she would be terminated.
Based on the record as a whole, it is neither reasonable nor rational for the Board
to assert that Prosper's warnings were vague or inconsistent. The Board's decision is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. Grace
Drilling Co., v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and the element
of "knowledge" should be deemed to have been satisfied.

IV. PROSPER SATISFIED IS OBLIGATION TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
The Board argues that Prosper failed to marshal the evidence to support of its
claim that Hickman was terminated for just cause. This argument is contrary to the
information presented in Prosper's brief
The marshaling obligation requires Prosper to locate and disclose the evidence
supporting findings that are challenged. In this matter, Prosper challenged two findings:
first, the mixed question of law and fact whether the economy prevented Hickman from
having "control" over the factors leading to his separation, and second, whether

7

The Board further asserts that Hickman believe he was somehow entitled to
"special treatment". (B. at 10). Not only did Hickman never suggest such he was
entitled to "special treatment", but grounds the Board cites to supporting this conclusion
are similarly not supported by the record and are disputed by Prosper.
12

Hickman had knowledge that if his performance did not improve he would be
terminated.
In Prosper's Statement of Facts, Heading II, Page 5, Prosper included a Section
entitled "Marshaled Facts Supporting Terminated[sic]Was Without Cause". This
Section cites to the Hickman's single reference to the economy as well as to Hickman's
statement that customers might not want to spend money. It also identifies that
Hickman felt he was using a slower script and that at times he wasn't feeling well. The
marshaled facts identify that Hickman claimed Prosper would "work with him", and that
he claims he never heard the word "fired". (Petitioner's brief at 5). As such Prosper
identified the portions of the record that support the Board's findings.
On page 10, Prosper specifically states that the Board found it was not within
Hickman's control to do his job because of the nature of the economy and because
consumers could spend their money elsewhere (Petitioner's brief at 10). Prosper then
proceeded to establish that it was Hickman's inefficiency that led to his separation and
not the status of the economy. In fact, Prosper dedicated Section I, Subpart D, of its
brief to explaining that the finding that the economy wasn't in Hickman's control was
inconsistent with Hickman's own view of whether sales were within his control. The
Board neither cites to nor references any material fact that Prosper omitted or failed to
marshal regarding the disputed finding.
Similarly, regarding the issue of "knowledge", Prosper stated that Hickman
believe that Prosper would continue to work with him (Petitioner's brief at 21), and that
he claims he never heard the word "fired" (Petitioner's brief at 5). Prosper then
13

proceeded to establish why this factual finding was inconsistent with, and not supported
by, the whole record. Prosper acknowledges that it did not specifically address
Hickman's claim that he wasn't told he would be "fired", but there is no legal
requirement to use the word fired, and thus Prosper was not obligated to specifically
refuted it. The Board neither cites to nor references any material fact that Prosper
omitted or failed to marshal regarding the issue of "knowledge".
Contrary to the Board's assertion, Prosper identified the disputed findings, culled
the record to see what evidence supported the findings, identified the portions of the
record supporting the findings, and then proceeded to show how the record did not
support the findings. Prosper satisfied its marshaling obligation by identify the record
that supported the Board's findings, and the record shows that Hickman was in
sufficient control of the sales process and that he had reasonable knowledge that he
would be terminated.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals Board's
decision affirming the award of unemployment benefits and find it was an abuse of
discretion to award unemployment benefits in this matter.
DATED this _[0_ day of November, 2010.

Daniel J. Anderson
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner
Prosper Team, Inc.
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